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Responding to Attacks on Critical
Computer Infrastructure
What Targets? What Rules of Engagement?
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Introdudion

Ifn 1997, in an exercise emphasizing infrastructure security, the National SelLcurity Agency e:A1'osed the United States' vulnerability to the disruption of
computer operations at our major military commands at the hands of a hostile
State or an organization with hostile intent.! A year earlier, US authorities had
detected the introduction of a program, called a "sniffer," into computers at
NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center, that permitted the perpetrator to download a large volume of complex telemetry information transmitted from satellites. The Deputy Attorney General reported that the "sniffer" had remained in
place for a significant period of time. 2 Of equal concern, an FBI report in 1999
detailed Chinese efforts to attack US Government information systems, including the White House network. 3 These actual and projected interstate intrusions
into Government computer networks once thought secure raise important
questions concerning what, ifany, rights in self-defense are triggered by such attacks. More importantly, they pose the issue of how the right of self-defense, if
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an attack impacts a vital national security interest, would be translated into effective rules of engagement, specifically, legally defensible targeting decisions.

Understanding the Threat
The world of information operations represents an environment created by
the confluence of cooperative networks of computers, information systems, and
telecommunication infrastructures. The concern addressed here relates to the
threat posed to these systems when operations are unlawfully disrupted, denied,
or degraded, or when secure information that is stored in computers or computer networks is destroyed, compromised, or altered in such a way that it has a
destructive effect on the national security interests ofa nation. Computer espionage and computer network attacks, as well as the subversion of political, economic, and/or non-military information bearing on a nation's capabilities and
vulnerabilities, may well constitute an unlawful use of force warranting a military response under traditional international law principles.
The threshold issues which emerge are: (1) which peacetime interstate activities within the telecommunications highway constitute a threat or use of force;
(2) when does such a threat constitute an attack under the international law such
that a right to use force in self-defense exists; and (3) what is an appropriate response. To respond to these issues, we must understand the military applications
of information technology. This requires an understanding of the Internet. The
Internet was originally a network of computers linked by telecommunications
infrastructure and managed by the Department of Defense (DoD) in the 1970s.
The internal computer networks of universities and private research facilities
were merged through the development ofhypertext, created in 1989 as the primary platform of the Internet. It (hypertext) translates diverse computer protocols into standard format.
This hypertext process, while extremely beneficial to both the military and
civilian sectors, has created vulnerabilities. The World Wide Web, the full
implementation of the Internet, which is at once the heart of the Defense Reform Initiative and key to the reengineering and streamlining of our business
practices, can provide adversaries with a potent instrument to obtain, correlate, evaluate, and adversely affect an unprecedented volume of aggregated
information critical to proper management of DoD and US infrastructure
capabilities.
This chapter responds to these attacks on US infrastructure. Even though internationallaw could not have anticipated specific information warfare concerns
when the Hague Conventions of 1899, addressing means and methods of
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warfare, were negotiated, the drafters thereof did antJ.clpate technological
change. The "Martens Clause," included within both Hague Convention II
1899, and Hague Convention IV 1907, provides that even in cases not explicitly
covered by specific agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of principles of international law derived from established
custom, principles ofhumanity, and the dictates ofpublic conscience, and therefore are not left to the arbitrary judgment of military commanders. 4 This provision was considered necessary to prevent future unnecessary and/or
disproportionate destruction from weapons systems not yet developed. The
drafters had just witnessed unimaginable carnage in the Crimean War and the
American Civil War resulting from advanced rifling techniques and other innovations, and were cognizant that warfare was rapidly changing. As Greenberg, et
al., so accurately state, as a result of the Martens Clause, "attacks will be judged
largely by their effects, rather than by their methods."5

The Legal Parameters for Response
UN Charter System
The existing legal regime available to deter destructive actions through
computer technology includes the United Nations Charter system and customary international law. The basic provision restricting the threat or use of
force in international relations is Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter. That
provision states: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use offorce against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations."6
The underlying purpose of Article 2(4), to regulate aggressive behavior between States, is identical to that ofits precursor, the Covenant of the League of
Nations. Article 12 of the Covenant stated that League members were obliged
not to "resort to war."7 This terminology, however, left unmentioned actions
which, although clearly hostile, could not be considered to constitute acts of
war. The drafters of the UN Charter wished to ensure that the legal niceties of
a conflict's status did not preclude cognizance by the international body. Thus,
in drafting Article 2(4), the term "war" was replaced by the phrase "threat or
use of force." The wording was interpreted as prohibiting a broad range of
hostile activities including not only "war" and other equally destructive conflicts, but also applications of force of a lesser intensity or magnitude. 8
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UN General Assembly Resolution 2625
The United Nations General Assembly has clarified the scope of Article 2 in
two important resolutions, both adopted unanimously.9 Resolution 2625, the
Declaration on Friendly Relations, describes behavior which constitutes the
"unlawful threat or use offorce" and enumerates standards of conduct by which
States must abide. 1o Contravention of any of these standards of conduct is declared to be in violation of Article 2(4).11

UN General Assembly Resolution 3314
Resolution 3314, The Definition of Aggression, provides a detailed statement on the meaning of "aggression" and defines it as "the use ofarmed force by
a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political integrity or political independence ofanother State, or in any manner inconsistent "\vith the Charter of the United Nations. "12 This resolution contains a list ofacts which qualify
as acts of aggression. Included in the list is "the use of any weapon by a State
against the territory of another State."13 The resolution provides that the State
which commits an act ofaggression violates international law as embodied in the
Charter. 14
The actions of States or their surrogates in supporting or taking part in acts
of aggression through information technology that threaten vital national interests of a State or States, whether through disruption of military information downlinks in satellites, sabotage ofvital computer networks, or infiltration
of electronic commercial transmission systems, clearly fall within the scope
of Article 2(4).15

The Relationship Between Customary International Law and the Charter
When the UN Charter was drafted in 1945, the right of self-defense was the
only included exception to the prohibition ofthe use offorce. Customary international law had previously accepted reprisal, retaliation, and retribution as legitimate responses as well. Reprisal allows a State to commit an act that is
otherwise illegal to counter the illegal act ofanother State. Retaliation is the infliction on the delinquent State of the same injury that it has caused the victim.
Retribution is a criminal law concept, implying vengeance, that is sometimes
used loosely in the international law context as a synonym for retaliation. While
debate continues as to the present status of these responses, the US position has
always been that actions protective of US interests, rather than being punitive in
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nature, offer the greatest hope ofsecuring a lasting, peaceful resolution ofinternational conflict. 16
The right ofself-defense was codified in Article 51 ofthe Charter. That article
provides: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right ofindividual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of
the United Nations .... "17 The use of the word "inherent" in the text ofArticle
51 suggests that self-defense is broader than the immediate Charter parameters.
During the drafting of the Kellogg-Briand Treaty, for example, the United
States expressed its views as follows:
There is nothing in the American draft of an anti-war treaty which restricts or
impairs in any way the right of self-defense. That right is inherent in every
sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty. Every nation is free at all times and
regardless of treaty provisions to defend its territory from attack or invasion and it
alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in
self-defense. 18
Because self-defense is an inherent right, its contours have been shaped by
custom and are subject to customary interpretation. Although the drafters ofArticle 51 may not have anticipated its use in protecting States from destructive actions perpetrated through technological means, international law has long
recognized the need for flexible application. Former Secretary of State George
Shultz emphasized this point when he stated that: "The UN Charter is not a suicide pact. The law is a weapon on our side and it is up to us to use" it to its maximum extent."19 The final clause of Article 2(4) supports this interpretation and
forbids the threat or use offorce "in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations."20
The late Professor Myres McDougal, ofyale Law School, has placed the relationship between Articles 2(4) and 51 in clearer perspective:
Article 2(4) refers to both the threat and use of force and commits the Members to
refrain from the "threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent \vith the Purposes of the
United Nations;" the customary right ofself-defense, as limited by the requirements
of necessity and proportionality, can scarcely be regarded as inconsistent with the
purpose of the United Nations, and a decent respect for balance and effectiveness
would suggest that a conception ofimpermissible coercion, which includes threats of
force, should be countered \vith an equally comprehensive and adequate conception
ofpennissible or defensive coercion ....21
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Significant from Professor McDougal's interpretation is our correlative recognition of the right to counter the imminent threat of techno-violence as well
as actual destructive acts of information warfare. This comprehensive conception ofpermissible or defensive actions, honoring appropriate response to threats
ofan imminent nature, is merely reflective ofthe customary international law. It
is precisely this anticipatory element that is critical to an effective policy to counter destructive acts against critical information systems. This does not suggest the
lack of international law restraints upon the determination of necessity for preemptive action. Rather, it suggests that legitimate considerations for effective
response to evidence of imminent destructive acts against critical communications infrastructure must be appraised in the total conte:l...'i: in which they occur.
One aspect of this contextual appraisal of necessity, especially as it relates to responding after the fact to destructive acts against our critical information systems, concerns the issue ofwhether force can be considered necessary ifpeaceful
measures are available to lessen the threat. To require a State to tolerate attacks
on infrastructure critical to its security and/ or economic well-being without resistance, on the grounds that peaceful means have not been exhausted, is absurd.
Once an attack on critical infrastructure has occurred, the failure to consider a
military response would play into the hands of those governments or groups
who deny the relevance oflaw in their actions. The legal criteria for the proportionate use offorce is established once a State or identifiable group-supported attack on technical infrastructure critical to the security of the nation has taken
place. No State is obliged to ignore an attack as irrelevant, and the imminent
threat to the national security requires consideration of a response.
A related, but more difficult, issue concerns the elapsed time between the attack on critical infrastructure and the identification of the State or group responsible. Admittedly, there must be some temporal relationship between a
destructive act and the lawful defensive response. Nevertheless, it would be unreasonable to preclude the victim of techno-violence from redress, based upon a
doctrinaire determination that the threat of further destructive intrusions into a
critical system is no longer imminent, when the perpetrator's own actions have
precluded immediate identification.
The requirement of proportionality is linked to necessity. Professor
McDougal and Dr. Feliciano define the rule as follows:
Proportionality in coercion constitutes a requirement that responding coercion
be limited in intensity and magnitude to what is reasonably necessary prompdy to
secure the permissible objectives of self-defense. For present purposes, these
objectives may be most comprehensively generalized as the conserving of
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important values by compelling the opposing partiCIpant to terminate the
condition which necessitates responsive coercion.22
This definition simply requires a rational relationship between the nature of
the attack and the nature of the response. Although the relationship need not approach precision, a nation subjected to an isolated intrusion and disruption ofan
important computer system may not be entitled to launch a strike on the offender nation. Other canons of military practice, such as conservation of resources, support the principle of restraint in defense. The United Nations has
condemned as reprisals those defensive actions that greatly exceeded the provocation.23 Where there is evidence that a continuation of destructive electronic
sabotage will occur, beyond the triggering event, that could threaten the very fiber
ofa nation's ability to defend itself, however, a response beyond that related to the
initial intrusion would be legally appropriate to counter the continuing threat.
Because the real-time relationship between threat and threat recognition is
often compressed in the techno-violence arena, strategy development is severely .
limited \vith respect to the non-military initiatives that may be considered in response to cyber-attack, although they are always the options of choice where
available. Traditional means of conflict resolution, authorized by law and customary practice, are often precluded because attacks on computer systems are,
by nature, covert in execution, unacknowledged by the State or group sponsor,
and practiced with silent effectiveness.
It must be noted, however, that non-coercive efforts to avoid attacks on computer systems and telecommunication networks are also important. Diplomatic
action, alone or in concert with allies or international organizations with conceivable successful impact upon a State or group considering such a cyber initiative, should be considered and employed whenever possible. In 1998, for
example, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 53170,24 an initiative of
the Russian Federation, that called upon Member States "to promote at multilateral levels the consideration of existing and potential threats in the field ofinformation security. "25 The United States supported this resolution with the
follo\ving pertinent comments:
The General Assembly's adoption of the resolution in plenary will launch the
international community on a complex enterprise' encompassing many
interrelated £actors which delegates ... do not ordinarily address. For example,
the topic includes technical aspects that relate to global communications-as well
as non-technical issues associated with econOlnic cooperation and trade,
intellectual property rights, law enforcement, anti-terrorist cooperation, and
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other issues that are considered in the Second and Sixth Committees. Further, the
actions and programs ofgovernments are by no means the only appropriate focus,
for the initiative also involves important concerns of individuals, associations,
enterprises, and other organizations that are active in the private sector. 26

Despite such international initiatives focusing upon multilateral cooperation,
the opportunity to look to outside assistance in protecting secure transmissions
and critical systems in circumstances where our national security is threatened, is
likely illusory. That responsibility will most certainly remain exclusively within
the National Command Authorities.

Operational-Legal Considerations in Addressing Techno-Violence
Operational Law Context Provided in Rules of Engagement
The rules ofnecessity and proportionality in the information warfare scenario
are given operational significance through rules of engagement (ROE). ROE
are directives that a government may establish to define the circumstances and
limitations under which its forces will initiate and continue responsive actions to
eliminate the threat posed by an attack through technical or other means on
critical communications/information infrastructure. In the US context, this
ensures that the National Command Authorities' guidance for handling crisis responses to techno-violence and other threats is provided, through the Joint
ChiefS of Staff aCS), to subordinate headquarters and deployed US forces both
during armed conflict and in periods of crisis short of war.
ROE reflect domestic law requirements and US commitments to internationallaw. They are impacted by political, as well as operational considerations.
For the commander concerned with responding to a threat to his communications/ command and control infrastructure, ROE represent limitations or upper
bounds on how to utilize defensive and/or responsive systems and forces, ,vithout diminishing the authority to effectively protect his own critical infrastructure from attack.
Evolution of ]CS Rules of Engagement
Techno-violence against a critical US computer system, whether information, communications, or command and control-related, represents hostile activity which may trigger the applicable ROE. Until June 1986, the only US
peacetime ROE applicable worldwide were the JCS Peacetime ROE for US
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Seaborne Forces. These ROE, which unti11986 served as the basis for all commands' peacetime ROE, were designed exclusively for the maritime environment. In June 1986, Secretary of Defense Weinberger promulgated more
comprehensive ROE for sea, air, and land operations worldwide.27 The 1986
Peacetime ROE provided the on-scene commander with the flexibility to respond to hostile intent, as well as hostile acts, and unconventional threats with
minimum necessary force, and to limit the scope and intensity of the threat.
The strategy underlying the 1986 ROE sought to terminate violence quickly
and decisively on terms favorable to the United States. In October 1994, Secretary of Defense Aspin approved the Standing Rules of Engagement for US
Forces (SROE), which significantly broadened the scope of US national
ROE.28 As established in the SROE, US policy, should deterrence fail, provides flexibility to respond to crises with options that are both proportional to
the provocation and designed to limit the scope and intensity of the conflict,
discourage escalation, and achieve political and military objectives. The inherent right of self-defense establishes the policy framework for the SROE.
These SROE are intended to provide general guidelines on self-defense and are
applicable worldwide to all echelons of command. Providing guidance governing the use offorce consistent with mission accomplishment, they are to be used,
absent superseding guidance, in operations other than war, during transition
from peacetime to armed conflict or war, and during armed conflict.
The eA-panded national guidance represented in the 1994 SROE, as further
refined in the 2000 SROE, has greatly assisted in providing both clarity and flexibility of action for our theater commanders. The approval by the Secretary of
Defense has ensured consistency in the way all military commanders, wherever
assigned, address unconventional threats such as those posed to our advanced
command and control infrastructure systems when these systems or computer
networks are destroyed, compromised, or altered so as to have a destructive effect on the national security interests of the nation.

Targeting Considerations
The SROE, as they relate to information warfare, are implemented through
the law of targeting, a subset of the law ofarmed conflict. The law of targeting is
based upon three fundamental principles. These are:
• The right ofStates to adopt means ofinjuring the enemy is not unlimited.
• The launching of attacks against the civilian population as such is
prohibited.
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• Distinctions must be made between combatants and noncombatants, to
the effect that noncombatants are spared to the extent possible.29
Because the law of armed conflict is an eminently practical law which takes
into account military efficiency, these basic principles are also consistent with
the response authorized for non-violent but equally destructive forms of coercive activity, such as sabotage of critical defense computer systems. Moreover,
targeting theory is premised upon practical considerations that serve the purpose
ofdefining the objects oflegitimate and proportional response to each variant of
aggression, whether it be an armed attack on US facilities or an equally debilitating computer-assisted attack, and of providing functional targeting criterion to
the responsible official, whether civilian or military.
Executive Order 13010
The key, then, to an effective response to the threat posed by States or groups
engaging in attacks against US critical infrastructure must be the commitment to
address the attacks they sponsor within the scope of the law of armed conflict.
We must think of cyber aggression as a variant of terrorist activity. This is precisely the approach taken by the Clinton Administration. When President
Clinton signed Executive Order (EO) 13010 onJuly 15, 1996, thereby establishing the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection
(CCIP), he declared that certain designated "national infrastructures are so vital
that their incapacity or destruction ... would have a debilitating impact on the
defense or economic security of the United States." The eight categories of
critical infrastructure designated in the EO as requiring the development of a
national strategy for protection include: continuity ofgovernment; telecommunications; transportation; electric power systems; banking and finance; water
supply systems; gas and oil storage and transportation; and emergency services
(medical, police, fire and rescue). Chaired by Robert T. Marsh, a retired Air
Force General, the CCIP was tasked with developing a comprehensive national
strategy for protecting critical infrastructures from electronic and physical
threats. On October 13, 1997, the CCIP issued the unclassified version ofits report, entitled "Critical Foundations: Protecting America's Infrastructure." In
addition to determining the challenge of adapting to a changing culture, the report found the existing legal framework inadequate to deal with threats to critical infrastructure. The centerpiece of the CCIP's national strategy, then, is the
domestic and international legal regime required to protect against threats to
critical infrastructure. Although the report itself provides few specifics, on
May 22, 1998, the Administration issued Presidential Decision Directives
(PDD) 62 and 63 in implementation of its policy framework.
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Presidmtial Decision Directive 62
PDD 62, Combatting Terrorism, is the successor to National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 138, signed by President Reagan on April 3, 1984,
which determined that the threat of terrorism constitutes a form of aggression
and justifies acts in self-defense. 3o PDD 62 is more expansive in its coverage than
NSDD 138 and addresses a broad range ofunconventional threats, to include attacks on critical infrastructure, terrorist acts, and the threat of the use ofweapons
of mass destruction. The aim of the PDD is to establish a more pragmatic and
systems-based approach to protection of critical infrastructure and counter-terrorism, with preparedness the key to effective consequence management.
PDD 62 creates the new position of National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism, which will coordinate program
management through the Office of the National Security Advisor. 31
Presidential Decision Directive 63
PDD 63, Critical Infrastructure Protection, mandates that the National Coordinator, established in PDD 62, initiate immediate action between the public
and private sectors to ~sure the continuity and viability of critical infrastructures. The goal established within PDD 63 is to establish a reliable interconnected and secure information system infrastructure by the year 2003. A
National Plan Coordination Staffis tasked with integrating the plans developed
by the various departments of government serving as lead agencies within their
respective areas of responsibility into a comprehensive National Infrastructure
Assurance Plan, overseen by the National Infrastructure Assurance Council.
The Council includes representation from both the public and private sectors.
Under the PDD, the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation's National Infrastructure
Protection Center, established in February 1998, will continue to provide a
control and crisis management point for gathering information on threats to critical infrastructure and for coordinating the federal government's response. 32

Targeting in the Context ofPDD 62 and PDD 63
The issue remains, however, should the Critical Infrastructure Plan fail, what
legal remedy can be applied under the law ofarmed conflict. Ifa response isjustified, what targets in a perpetrator country are proportional to the threat posed by
destruction or compromise of critical infrastructure. Again, our experience in
addressing terrorism must be reviewed. The reason this is necessary is that the
flexibility of the law ofarmed conflict in addressing unconventional threats provides far more salient options than domestic law or intelligence law in cases
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where the very fiber of our national security is placed at risk. For example, as W.
Gary Sharp correcrly points out, an unlawful entry into and/or compromise of a
critical national security system by an individual or individuals can be viewed as
criminal activity under the jurisdiction of the federal and state law enforcement
officials. The same intrusion by the same individual or individuals representing a
State or international entity could be viewed as lawful espionage or intelligence
gathering practiced by all States. If, however, that intrusion and the debilitating
effect it has on national security can appropriately be characterized as an attack
on vital US national interests, the range of options is grearly enhanced.33
This is important because the State or group attempting to compromise US
national security through the calculated sabotage of critical infrastructure is attacking the nation, not with bombs or bullets, but ,vith the intent of destroying
equally critical elements of national well-being and sovereignty. The loss of a
power grid or of a US telecommunications network through computer gener- ated viruses for an extended period of time would have the capacity of placing
more Americans at risk than a significant military threat.
The United States was jolted into an awareness of the changing character of aggression when its embassy in Tehran was seized on November 4, 1979, by Iranian
militants who enjoyed the support ofAyatollah Khomeini's revolutionary govemment. 34 In August 1998, US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam were the
subjects of unconventional warfare attacks, resulting in the significant loss oflife in
Nairobi. In the attacks, a US response was only possible because of the linkage established between Osarna bin Laden's organization and the assaults on American
interests. The thrust of the new US strategy, oudined in PDD 62, must be to reclaim the initiative lost while the United States pursued a reactive policy toward
unconventional threats, especially those to its critical infrastructure.
An examination ofauthorized responses (and the selection ofappropriate targets) to techno-violence requires an understanding that cyberterrorism is a strategy that does not follow any of the traditional military patterns. In fact, a
fundamental characteristic of attacks on critical infrastructure is its violation of
the established norm ofinformation security. The only norm for cyberterrorism
is effectiveness. While traditional international law requires discrimination
among those affected by an attack and proportion in its intensity, the nature of
information warfare and cyberterrorism is such that success is measured by the
extent and duration of destructiveness to the systems targeted, ,vith no concern
for those affected. In the contemporary language of defense economics, they
wage countervalue rather than counterforce warfare.
Why is this important? It is important because the only credible response to
attacks on critical infrastructure is deterrence. There must be an assured,
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effective reaction that imposes unacceptable costs on the perpetrators and those
who make possible their activities. For domestic intruders, the criminal law may
suffice. For those operating outside the United States, the US reaction must
counter the cyber-terrorist's strategy \vithin the parameters of international law
and PDD 62. Those who suggest otherwise neither understand the inherent
flexibility of international law nor the cost of violating that law.
In this regard, a case for a response in self-defense is not persuasive either on
the political or legal level unless a reasonable basis of necessity is perceived.
Those to whom a justification is addressed (that is, other governments or the
public) will consider whether it is well founded; they will not regard the use of
force as a purely discretionary act. An important dimension of this question concerns the separate issue of when does action become necessary; that is, when is
the use offorce necessary to enforce adherence to the norm ofinformation security. As Professor Lauterpacht has pointed out, every State judges "for itself, in
the first instance, whether a case of necessity in self-defense has arisen," but that
"it is obvious that the question of the legality ofaction taken in self-preservation
is suitable for determination and must ultimately be determined by a judicial authority or political body .... "35 The United States has long taken the position
that each nation is free to defend itself and is the 'Judge of what constitutes the
right ofself-defense and the necessity ... ofsame."36 Similarly, more than a halfcentury ago, Secretary of State Frank Kellogg noted that when a State has resorted to the use of force, "if it has a good case, the world will applaud and not
condemn its actions."37

A Pro-Active Response to Threats to Critical Infrastructure is Authorized under
International Law
The decision to respond with force against techno-violence must be as
closely tied to a clear objective as in the case where planning is conducted at
the higher end of the coercion spectrum. Because the relationship between
objective and threat is often unclear in the low intensity conflict arena, a strategy to fight cyberterrorism must always focus on the underlying political purpose of the State or group attempting to degrade or destroy an element of
critical US infrastructure, whether that element be commercial, communications, intelligence, or defense-related. That purpose is unquestionably the degradation of our critical systems such that we are unable to defend ourselves
militarily or protect ourselves from serious political or financial overreaching
on the part of our adversaries. How do we counter this purpose, this objective?
Former Secretary of State Shultz was correct when he stated that US policy
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"must be unambiguous. It must be clearly and unequivocally the policy of the
United States to fight back-to resist challenges, to defend our interests ...
. "38 Implementation of this pro-active policy requires that we make the fullest
use of all the weapons in our arsenal. These should include not only those defensive and protective measures which reduce US systems-vulnerability, but
also new legal tools and agreements on international sanctions, as well as the
collaboration of other concerned governments. While we should use our military power only as a last resort and where lesser means are not available, there
will be instances where the use of force is the only alternative available to eliminate the threat to critical civil or military infrastructure.
Closely related to the legal question is the political question oflinkage. When
clear linkage to a supporting State exists, we must publicize that relationship and
respond with discrimination in a manner calculated both to eliminate the current threat while deterring the offending State from further destabilizing actions.
The" center ofgravity" in the offending State must always be that target or capability which most significandy undermines that State's will to continue to
destabilize our critical infrastructure. Since cyberterrorism is a lesser form ofinternational conflict and is bound by its rules, lawful response is properly limited
to those targets which do not enjoy civilian immunity. Military targets may be
preferable for two other reasons. First, the selection ofmilitary targets, while our
adversaries are attacking our civil infrastructure in violation ofinternational law,
should not raise concerns on the part of other States. Additionally, selection of
military targets would refocus attention on the fact that cyberterrorism and
techno-violence are, in fact, forms of armed conflict.
The thrust of this new strategy, outlined in PDDs 62 and 63, must be to reclaim the initiative lost while the United States pursued a reactive policy to incidents of information warfare which neither deterred cyber-terrorists nor
encouraged successful response. The key to an effective, coordinated policy to
address the threat posed by those willing to target our critical infrastructure is
the commitment to hold those accountable responsible under the law of armed
conflict. Full implementation of the two PDDs should lead to increased planning for protective and defensive measures to address this challenge to US national security, and, where deterrence fails, to respond in a manner which
eliminates the threat, rather than treating each incident after the fact as a singular crisis provoked by international criminals. By treating cyber-terrorists as
participants in international coercion where clear linkage can be tied to a State
actor, the right of self-defense against their sponsor is triggered, and responding coercion (political, economic, or military) may be the only proportional
response to the threat.
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This pro-active strategy to the threat posed by attacks on our critical infrastructure embraces the use of protective, defensive, non-military, and military
measures. It attempts, for the first time, to define acts designed to destabilize our
eight most important infrastructure systems in terms of "aggression," with the
concomitant right of self-defense available as a lawful and effective response.
The use of intemationallaw and, more specifically, the law of armed conflict,
will not only complement the current criminal law approaches, but give pause to
those who would target vital US interests.
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